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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 




I~Dl'~TRl.\L COJIMISR[ON OF 
rrr.\H, ~PERRY IL\~n 
CORPOIL\TJO~ and LIBERTY 
~IFTrAL Ii\SlTlL\XCT~ COJ[P.L\XY, 
n (, r e }/( 1 n 1, t ·". 
Case No. 
9969 
DEFE~D~\XTS' PI,:TlTION FOR REIIEARING 
AXD BRIEF IX SFPPOR'"r THEREOF 
PETITIOX FOR REHEARTXO 
Ddendant~ Sperry Rand Corporation and Liberty 
llutual Insurance Cmnpany petition tlw Court for a 
f(lhParin~ and rearo·ument of the above entitled ca~P 
' /"" 
upon tlw following grounds: 
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POINT 1. 
THE COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS BOTH STATU-
TORY AND ITS OWN LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL 
LAW STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING DENIAL OF AN 
AWARD BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
POINT 2. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFU-
SION AND UNCERTAINTY BOTH AS TO THE SCOPE OF 
THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION AND THE STABILITY AND MEAN-
ING OF ITS DECISIONS, AND IT MAKES ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT VERY DIFFI-
CULT AND UNCERTAIN. 
POINT 3. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IMPOSES AN UN-
DULY HEAVY BURDEN ON INDUSTRY AS REGARDS 
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND WILL CAUSE 
EMPLOYERS TO RESTRICT SEVERELY OR TO CANCEL 
MANY 0 F THE BENEFITS AND SERVICES WHICH THEY 
HAVE HERETOFORE PROVIDED. 
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\\'HERE I•'() B 1•:, defendants pray that the judgment 
and opinion of tlw ( 'onrt be recalled and a reargument 
btl}H'I'Illittt>d of thP entire emw . 
. \ hrit.f in support of this petition is filed herewith . 
.TORN H. SNOW 
701 Continental Bank Building 
~alt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants 
.IOIIX II. ~XO'Y Hereby certifies that he is at-
tonwy for dPfPndant 1wtitioners herein, and that in his 
opinion there is good rm1sP to believe the decision of the 
Court is (lfroneous and that the case should be reheard 
and rt•a r~\11'( l. as prayed for in said petition. 
ll.\ TED this .. k. day of .May, 1964. 
Q,-'--- _I "( ~ g___ ~--.r-················-~-~-----------·------·--------------------------------------------------------
\_ JOHN H. SNOW 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PE,TI'TION FOR REHEARING 
POINT 1. 
THE COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS BOTH STATU-
TORY AND ITS OWN LONG-ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL 
LAW STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING DENIAL OF AN 
AWARD BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
In literally dozens of cases since the Workmen's 
Compensation Law was adopted by Utah nearly 50 
years ago this Court has affirmed and reaffirmed the 
scope of the responsibility and discretion which are re-
served to the Industrial Commission in Workmen's Com-
pensation cases and the Court has determined and re-
iterated the standards by which the Court has deemed 
itself bound by statute, by principles of proper judicial 
administration and by self-imposed judicial restraint, in 
reviewing determinations of the Commission. 
Repeated so often and consistently in these cases 
that citation is unnecessary are the principles that great 
liberality must be granted to the Commission in consid-
ering and weighing the evidPnce before it; that findings 
and conclusions of thP Com1nission must be upheld if 
supported by any substantial, cmnpetent evidence; that 
the Court will not substitute its own judgment for that 
of the Commission as to findings and conclusions unless 
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it be ~hown that the Com1nission acted arbitrarily and 
t·npri<·iously in failing to arrive at the only reasonable 
finding warranted h~· the evidence; and, that findings 
and <'nnrlusions of thP Commission are treated the same 
n:-; a jury verdict and upheld if supported by any evi-
dPnrP PVPn though on occasion such findings and con-
<'lnsions may differ radically from those the Court would 
itself tnakP, and <>Y<'n though occasional hardship is 
l':tii:-:Pd therPhy to applicants who are denied an award. 
Althon~h in Strottd v. Industrial Comm. <1954), 272 
P.~<l 1~7. ~ U. :2d :270, cited in the Court's opinion of 
.\pril lfl, 1964, the Commission's denial of an award was 
annulled on aprwal, the Court there was careful to ex-
plain at sonw length the basis for its decision so as to 
bring the case within the scope of the Court's power of 
ft'\iew, as that power had been consistently delineated 
and explained in its prior decisions. The Court approved 
a h'~t which had been previously set out in Norris v. 
Industrial C'ommissioll (1936), 61 P.2d -±13, 90 Utah 256, 
by which to determine whf'tlwr or not the Commission's 
findin~~ become a 1natter of law for the Court to review. 
That tP~t requires essentially that before a Commission 
dPtermination can be overturned as a matter of law the 
' t>ddence must be undisputed, credible, unbiased, reason-
able. con\incing and subject to but a single explanation 
:'i\ n~ to ~npport the conclusion ''that the commission 
could only arrive at onr conclusion from the evidence, 
fUid it jn11nd contrary to that inrritnble conclusion." 
( Emphasi ~ added.) 
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Significantly, the Court there noted that (1) tlw 
instrumentality which caused the harm - the revolver 
- "was authorized and required" hy the employer and 
was carried "for the benefit of the employer," so that 
the type of accident suffered was readily foreseeable as 
"an ordinary risk of (being) a police officer;" ( 2.) the 
accident occurred on the employer's premises and clear-
ly within the spatial area within which the employee 
normally performed his tasks for the employer; (3) the 
accident occurred at a time when the employee had 
actually entered upon his employment, he having arrived 
at his place of employment h~T appointment to deliver to 
his fellow employees, in his official capacity as a police 
officer, a special car which belonged to his employer; 
and ( 4) the written decision of the Commission clearly 
showed that it had mistakenly applied well-established, 
simple, legal rules in concluding that the employee had 
either not yet entered upon his emplopnent or that he 
had departed therefrom in pursuing a program of his 
own at the time of the accident and, hence, that the 
coverage of the Act did not apply. Thus, the undisputed 
facts showed not only that the e1nployee ·was in fact in 
the cour~e of his employn1ent since he was actually on 
duty at the time of the accident but, also, that it aros(' 
out of the employment, since his presence at the accident 
scene and the instrumentality which caused the accident 
were both directly related to duties which were expected 
and required of him by his employ0r. 
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On thPRP facts the Court was justified in ruling that 
t lw cvi<lPTH'P logically and reasonably would support 
only onP conclusion and that the Commission found 
l'nntrary to that inPvitable conclusion due to its mistaken 
application of simplP rulEls of law. 
YiPwPd in this light, the Stroud case does not 
rrprP~Pnt a radical departure from but, rather, conforms 
to and reaffirm~ thP principles adhered to in the numer-
on~ l; tah cases referred to above. It preserves to the 
Commission thP measure of discretion and responsibility 
which it must have in this type of case if it is to be 
anything more than a mere assembler of evidence for 
tlw ~uprenw Court, if it is to exercise any meaningful 
judgment whatPver, and if its determinations are to 
have any real stability or meaning for employers and 
PmployPP~ alike. It maintains the same standards for 
l'PYiPw and tlw ::;anw principle of judicial restraint from 
interference with determinations of subordinate regu-
latory and judicial bodies which have so long been ad-
hPrt'd to in lTtah and in other states and which have, 
over many decades, proved indispensable to proper 
jndirial administration and to stability and dignity of 
ndmini~trative and judicial determinations. Any other 
,.iPw of the Strnud rasP renders the Commission virtu-
ally impotent and without authority as to the very 
matter~ it wn~ created to pass upon and determine. 
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In the present case there is simply no supportable 
basis for a conclusion, using the test from the Norris 
and Stroud decisions, that the Commission "could only 
arrive at one conclusion from the evidence, and that it 
found contrary to that inevitable conclusion." In sharp 
contrast with the evidence disclosed in the Stroud case, 
the evidence here showed at best a very fragile and 
tenuous relationship between the injuries and the em-
ployment. This relationship, while sufficient to support 
an award had one been made, was nonetheless much too 
slight to compel the conclusion as a matter of law that 
the Commission's determination \Yas contrary to tlw 
single possible, inevitable result. 
The evidence here showed that ( 1) the accident oc-
cured outside of applicant's regular hours of employ-
ment since she had "checked out" for the noon period 
and was on her own time ; ( 2) the injuries were sustained 
outside the spatial limits of applicant's employment 
since she had passed into the area where the employer's 
control over her was non-existent, even conceding the 
employer maintained some measure of control over its 
lessee, Clark, Inc.; (3) the instrun1entality which caused 
her injury was neither owned, controlled, handled nor 
authorized by her employer, nor was it otherwise related 
to or in any way beneficial to her employer or its busi-
ness; ( 4) at the time of the accident applicant was 
engaged in no activity for or beneficial to her employer, 
she being, instead, free to make use of her time as she 
pleased; and ( 5) except for the existence of the lease 
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lu·twt•Pn her PlllployPr and the cafeteria operator, and 
PX<'Ppt for t Itt• location of the eafdPria, which distinctions 
an· at mo~t but inconsPquential, applicant's injuries had 
no mon• r(llation to her employment than had they been 
int·m-red at the Naval Cafeteria or in Clearfield or 
I .a~·ton. 
It ~PPm~ inconceivable that on the basis of this 
uncontradicted evidence, which appears finnly to sup-
port tlw Commission's denial as not only permissible 
hut <'OITPd.. the Conrt could hold that the only inevitable 
ennelusion to havP lwc>n arrived at was that the injuries 
nro~P out of or in the course of the employment. Yet 
th~ Court's decision of April 15, 1964, must be based 
upon ~n<'h a holding, unless the Court has decided to 
mak~ a radical departure frmn its former standards of 
judicial reviPw a~ referred to above, and to take into its 
own hands, "·ithout legislative authorization or other 
apparent reason to do so, the discretion, judgment and 
rP~ponsibility which have heretofore reposed in the 
Commission. The Court's decision must rest upon one 
or the other of tlwse two bases, although the decision 
t'ai I~ to indicate which. Yet the far-reaching implica-
tinn~ of either basis for decision suggest the conclusion 
ti1:1t neither "·as intended hy the Court. 
The first basis for decision as noted above is 
nPitlwr logical nor reasonable. The second basis sub-
wrt:-: and undennines the YPry foundations of judicial 
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review and judicial administration which have been 
followed so long and so consistently in Utah and else-
where and upon which our employees, employ<'rs, 
legislators and citizens generally have come to rely and 
depend. Either basis arrogates to the Court powns 
which belong in the Commission. Either basis, if sus-
tained, will create uncertainty and confusion in Com-
mission determinations and leave the Commission 
without useable standards or guidelines within which 
its responsibilities and its judgment are to be exercised. 
In a large nun1ber, if not in the majority, of casPs 
before the Commission the evidence \Yill meet the 
standards of reliability which are enumerated in the 
S~roud case. Only seldom, however, will the evidence 
satisfy the remaining portion of the "stringent test" 
therein set forth - that portion which requires that 
the evidence be capable of supporting but a single, 
inevitable conclusion which is contrary to the Commis-
sion's determination. Clearly, therefore, the Court 
must apply both portions of this test if it is to preserve 
any measure of stability and certainty in this large 
segment of cases before the Commission. 
To disregard the second, and most important, por-
tion of this test as occurred in the Court's decision of 
' 
April 15, 19·64, will require, as to each of the cases in 
which the evidence is reliable and undisputed, an arl 
hoc determination by the Supreme Court on its partie-
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ular fad~, conditions and circumstances. And, in all 
such ea~P8 the Commission would be relegated to the 
rolP of a mere collector of evidence for the Supreme 
(
1ourt. 
Such a result runs directly contrary to the obvious 
purpose of the legislature in creating the Industrial 
Commission. This purpose was to repose in it a suffi-
ritlnt dignity, discretion and power to give stability 
and meaning to its determinations and to avoid the 
t>:dreme delay and cost to applicants and employers 
of resort to the courts, except to correct abuses of dis-
cretion and arbitrary acts of the Commission upon 
review in the Supreme Court. Certainly it was never 
intended and it does not make sense that the Supreme 
t 10Urt should overturn determinations of the Commis-
!:'ion and substitute its own judgment for that of the 
Commi~~ion simply because it does not agree with 
thPm, as i~ apparently tlw case here. 
In its decision of April 15, 1964, the Court disre-
garded its own basic standards for review and refused 
to abide hy its own clear declarations, such as that 
eontained in Kent 'l'. Industrial Commission <1936), 57 
P.~d i~-+. 89 lTtah 381, at page 726 of the Pacific Re-
port~. a~ follows: 
·· 'Yhen we are asked to overturn the findings 
and conclusions of the commission denying com-
pPnsation, it must be made clearly to appear that 
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the commission acted wholly without cause in 
rejecting or in refusing to believe or give effect 
to the evidence. It was not intended by the Work-
men's Compen.sation Act ... that this court, in 
matters of evrdence, should to any extent sub-
stitute the judgment of the court upon factual 
matters for the judgment of the commission." 
* * * * * 
"That there will occasionally arise cases that 
appear hard, and those from the conclusions of 
which we may radically differ, must be admitted. 
By the law, however, we rnust abide." 
* * * * * 
"As indicated, the position may at times 
appear to be a hardship upon applicants, especi-
ally those to whom the commission refuses to 
make an award upon apparently credible and 
substantial evidence even at times apparently 
free fron1 conflict. That the instant case may 
fall within that category in the minds of some 
does not justify a departure from the law as we 
find it." 
By its decision the Court, in one fell swoop, without 
warning or apparent justification, and without explana-
tion, cast aside nearly a half-century of precedent and 
embarked upon a radicall~~ ne·w and uncharted course. 
Certainly, the desire to see applicant given an award 
under the facts and circumstances of this case cannot 
justify the repudiation and disregard of our entire sys-
tem of judicial review. 
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POINT 2. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFU-
SION AND UNCERTAINTY BOTH AS TO THE SCOPE OF 
THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION AND THE STABILITY AND MEAN-
ING OF ITS DECISIONS, AND IT MAKES ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT VERY DIFFI-
CULT AND UNCERTAIN. 
Surprisingly, the Court's decision fails to specify 
the basis of its action in overruling the Commission or 
to t>xplain even in general terms the powers and discre-
tion which the Cmnmission may hereafter exercise in 
<'a:-;t·~ before it. Similarly, the decision avoids the obvi-
on~ and pressing questions as to what standards of 
review are to be applied in future appeals from the 
Commission to the Supreme Court. It renders commis-
sion action a derelict upon uncharted seas, without pow-
Pr and without guidance. 
Overruling, as it does, a determination of the Com-
mission which, on the evidence, could have gone either 
way. the decision leaves the Commission with the statu-
tory duty of making judgments and handing down 
d•·<'i::>ions which are, in practical effect, meaningless 
and entitled to no respect whatever. In other words, the 
l'ommi~sion appears to be relegated to the position of 
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necessarily performing meaningl<'ss tasks with regard to 
the essential functions which it was created to perform. 
Its only significant remaining role appears to be merely 
to gather the evidence upon which the Supreme Court, 
on appeal, will pass its own judg1nents and base its own 
decisions. 
Certainly, in vir\\' of the radical departure from 
precedent and the far-reaching implications which the 
decision represents, even if conservatively construed, 
some indication as to the basis upon which it is founded 
and some explanation of its true scope become absolutely 
essential to those who are affected by it and must govern 
their conduct accordingly, including citizens, employers, 
employees, legislators and the Commission. 
What part, if any, of the great body of precedent 
referred to above is now of any value or effect in the 
interpretation of decisions of the Commission and ap-
peal of those decisions to the Supreme Court¥ What 
standards of review, if any, are to govern hereafter in 
appeals from Commission rulings'? What powers, re-
sponsibility and discretion may the Commission here-
after exercise in cases where the evidence is basically 
uncontradicted and reliable¥ Should the Commission 
continue, on the basis of the evidence produced before it, 
to make judgments and hand down decisions even when 
they are obviously going to have no value or dignit~· to 
either applicants or employPrs ¥ 
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~I u~t applieant~ and employers hereafter resort to 
tlw costly and time-consuming procedure of an appeal 
in all <·asPH in which the <·vid<>nr<· is essentially uncon-
tmdieh•d and reliable¥ If not, what is the alternative 
that ean IH· follmYPd 1 Are the determinations of all 
otlwr ~tatP regulatory admini~trative bodies, including 
thP Publie HPrvirP Com1nission and State Welfare Com-
mi~~ion, to be similarly downgraded and disregarded, 
:-;irwe all havP heretofore been subject to substantially 
thP ~anw procedures and principles of review on appeal~ 
~,nrther, what is the present effect of the statutory 
diredion that the Commission, Sec. 35-1-88, U.C.A. 19·53, 
"may make its investigations in such manner as in its 
j11d_qmntf is best rn lenlated to ascertain the substantial 
rig-ht~ of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit 
of thiH title!" (Emphasis added.) 
The smooth, workable and economical administra-
tion of tlw \Vorkmen's Compensation Act requires more 
than an effectivP Industrial Commission. Equally im-
portant ar<) tho~P vast numbers of employers and 
indn~trie~ throughout the state "'ho are in daily associa-
tion with the problems of compliance with the Act and 
th,) furtherance of its aims. \Yorking with them, as 
indi~1wn~ahle aicles, are those representatives of the 
insurance industry and those trained in problen1s of 
~~)If-insurance and :-;tate insurance, all of ·whmn must 
know and understand the scope and meaning of the Act. 
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The decision leaves these people in a quandary 
about the many and varied gratuitous fringe benefits 
and employeP recreational programs which, heretofore, 
have been uniformly thought to be beyond the scope of 
coverage. Before launching new programs, and before 
renewing those in existence, management demands 
answers to the questions of scope and cost of such pro-
grams. 
As these unanswered questions show, the Court's 
decision renders extremely difficult, if not impossible, a 
proper administration of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that the Court 
give without delay an explanation of its decision, if it 
is to stand, and that it give some answer to the vital 
question raised above. It is submitted that the result 
reflected in these questions was not intended by the 
Court. 
POINT 3. 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IMPOSES AN UN-
DULY HEAVY BURDEN ON INDUSTRY AS REGARDS 
EMPLOYMENT-RELATED ACTIVITIES AND WILL CAUSE 
EMPLOYERS TO RESTRICT SEVERELY OR TO CANCEL 
MANY OF THE BENEFITS AND SERVICES WHICH THEY 
HAVE HERETOFORE PROVIDED. 
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Apart from the disruption and uncertainty which 
t ht~ ( 'ourt·~ dP<'ision creates, as noted above, it is un-
:-;ound and contrary to the public interest for the addi-
tional reason that it imposes a burden on industry 
which i~ disproportionately related to any employment 
a<'tiYity or benefit to the employer. Furthermore, it 
nt-eP~:mrily penalizes attempts by employers to provide 
gratuitou~ fringe benefits, services and conveniences 
for Plltployt>P::-1. lTnder the decision any activity or serv-
ieP which ean bP construed as integrated in any way 
with an employPr's business and which can be conceiv-
ably construed as advantageous to the employer, even 
in terms of satisfaction of the employees, may require 
en\·Pra~P under thr Act. 
.T ustification for the broad assertions of the pre-
,·inu~ paragraph is found in the Court's statement, in 
the fourth paragraph of its decision, that in determin-
ing if an aetiYity is covered by workmen's compensa-
tion, the "('~~Pntial thing" is that there "be some 
~nh~tantial relationship" between the activity and "the 
carrying on of the e1nplover's business. That is it 
"' ' ~hnuld be of such a nature that it may reasonably be 
a~~nmed that it ,,.otlld be of some benefit to the em-
ployer in the operation of his business or the advance-
nwnt of his interests." (Emphasis added.) 
There is scarePly no facility or activity provided 
g-ratnitnu~ly by an employer that may not be said, by 
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some at least, to be of some benefit to the employer. 
What may be "reasonably assumed" by one person 
frequently is vigorously disputed by another - as 
evidenced by close, but majority, results in elections, 
majority verdicts and majority and dissenting opinions 
of the courts. 
If the decision of this Court stands, the determina-
tion of what may be "reasonably assumed" appears to 
rest in the Court, rather than in the Commission. 
Under such circumstances, what an employer may have 
provided as a gratuity is now revealed as a potential 
hazard and his reaction is predictable. 
If an employer is to be compelled to provide cover-
age for these incidental, gratuitous and non-essential 
activities, regardless of how distantly related they may 
be to the tasks perfonned by the employee and regard-
less of the degree of control which the employer exer-
cises thereby over the employee, it is obvious that 
many such services and benefits will be discontinued 
or never provided to the employee in the first instance. 
Why should an employer continue to provide these free 
services and subject itself to this avoidable liability1 
More important, why should the employer be thus 
penalized for voluntarily improving the lot of his 
workers~ It is submitted that the policy of the law 
should be to encourage, rather than to penalize, these 
widespread, beneficial practices of employers. 
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'rlw dPri~ion hen' under attaek disregards the basic 
standard~, both statutory and decisional, which have 
~uidPd and restrained the Supreme Court in its review 
nt' hundreds of decisions of the Industrial Commission 
ovPt' thP ~·par~ . 
. \ JH'Pcedent lH'Pd not be followed, merely because 
it is a pn'e(•dPnt, but tested rules and standards should 
not be ::-;wPpt away unless the reason for their existence 
has ht>Pn examined and found no longer valid. No such 
Pxamination \ra~ attPmpted in this case. 
l. pon reflection and upon analysis of the far rang-
ing 1'1'1\•d::-; of this (lPei:.;ion, effeets upon those who ad-
minister the \Y orkmen's Compensation Act and upon 
those who mu:.;t live within it, the Court should conclude 
that tlw (lecision ~hould be recalled, thP case should be 
n•ar~uPd and. upon such event, the order of the Indus-
trial Connni~~inn should be affirnwd. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOH~ H. SXO\V 
Attornroy for Defendants 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 
f'alt Lake City, Utah 
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